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l w~lI discuss how the negotiations over the defining attributes
?f state ~uthonty and of state-society relations at important conjunctures
In N~~al 5 recent political history are related to political and economic
condltlO~s ":,,ith n~tionaL regional and global outreach. The unravelling
of the mtncate 1I1terplay between internal and external st t Id" rueuro
con 1tlO115 and ma~or national political events over nearly five decades
(1950 -] 996) questions any facile characterisation of the Maoist rebellion
(which started in 1996) as an internal conflict only. The exposition
~oreo~er questIOns any characterisation of the Nepalese state as
increasingly "developmentalist" and hence accountable from a rights-
based perspective (see Bleie et. ai, 2000).
!.he main analytical focus of this article is on the structural
conditIOns and agency actions that resulted in 1996 in a Maoist-led
rebellion m this richly endowed Himalayan kingdom 2 Th' C
. . . IS lOCUS
mevltably raises the need for an analytical framework to explain the
causes of the inception of the Maoist uprising in Nepal. To outline the
:vhole net:vork of interacting ultimate and proximate causes and effects
IS exceedmgly demanding, analytically speaking, as well as space
consummg, and thus too tall an order for an article. Instead, this article
seeks to establish a more tentative explanatory framework of the dialectic
betw~en structural conditions and agency actions, which to some degree
explams both some enduring features of the autocratic state and its ability
to adapt - at least for an mtennedlate period over the last 50 years _
under dramatically changing circumstances. Well-known historical
I
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events, including the palace revolt in 1951, the democratic refonns of
1959, the 1980 referendum, the People's Movement in ]990, the
declaration of People's War in 1996 and the April Movement in 2006,
are analysed by combining insights from political science, public
administration and anthropology. A straightforward instrumentalist view
of government that conceptualises policy as technical, rational, action-
oriented instruments for effecting change is supplemented by an
anthropological view of governance (see Shore and Wright, 200 I). This
view conceptualises governance as governed by more complex and
diffuse symbolic processes which establish indigenous institutional rules
and codes of conduct that are internalised. Through these processes,
certain fundamental tenets of the prevailing order of governance are
naturalised and therefore scarcely subjected to reflection. Such a
perspective is applied in order to explain the strikingly widespread and
deeply-felt belief in the sacrosanct Hindu monarchy among supporters
both of the autocratic regime and of liberal democracy.
This view of governance, derived from political anthropology, also
gains analytical strength from drawing on a more comprehensive theory
of the nature of this Hindu state and its underlining cultural models of
divine kingship, sovereignty, body politic and the nature of cultural
diversity] This analytical approach to governance is found to be useful in
explaining how and why the monarch has been unaccountable until the
historical decision in 2006 of the reinstated House of Representatives,
and how the bureaucracy in Nepal has been imbued with an institutional
logic based on patronage and loyalty, a logic unlike the Western notion
of accountability as answerability to human rights concerns' While
Nepal's rulers, for purely pragmatic reasons, in the period between ]950
and ]990 tapped legitimacy through a development discourse, the
internal workings of the government, bureaucracy and public domain
created few incentives for establishing basic accountability mechanisms. 5
In ]990, the People's Movement (Jana Andolan) fought through a
new democratic constitution. This led to the creation of a democratically
elected government, which subsequently ratified a number of human
rights conventions. These unprecedented events promised a new era of
intensified efforts to institutionalise basic accountability mechanisms.
The reasons why such high expectations were dashed will be explored.
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The discussions in this article are confined to analysing most, if not
all, the structural conditions for the violent conflict between the state and
the military and political movement led by the Communist Party of
Nepal (MaOist). Thus, the exposition is not meant to cover all the
necessary and sufficient causes for the rapid escalation of the conflict
which has over the last decade engulfed large parts of the country in civi;
w~r and led to a reduced presence (and in certain areas full withdrawal)
of the "old state's" functions. This does not detract from the fact that a
number of the structural causes outlined here are of considerable
relevance in understanding the escalation of the conflict, including the
otherwise inexplicable positions of the main stakeholders (the r~ling
monarch, the Royal Nepalese Anny, the mainstream political parties and
the Commumst Party of Nepal (Maoist) in a situation that seem nearly
unsolvable, but eventually ended in a Comprehensive Peace Accord in
late 2006.
In order tobe able to cast some light on the degree of continuity and
change m the Hmdu state, the article starts out with a brief analysis of the
state smce the unification of Nepal in the late eighteenth century Th' .
. . ISffi
mtended to claritY and explicate the salient structural features of the state
m 1951., including its underpinning cultural models, when strictly
autocratIc rule ended and a period of early contestation of the Hindu state
began. The article argues for caution against sweeping assertions about
the political history of the last half century as a period of shifts between
aut?~ratic and democratic government. It argues instead that the old
pol~t~cal regime underwent certain restructurings as it reasserted its
pohtlcal dominance through a dramatic expansion of a bureaucracy with
a modem appearance, but governed by institutional rules and practices
grounded m an upper-caste, patronage-oriented court culture. This
massIve ~xpansion of the state apparatus only created the appearance of a
progressIve Nepalese accommodation to international norms of demo-
cracy and a redistributive and accountable state ensuring human rights. In
real tenns, the expansion led to a certain upward mobility predominantly
of men from the hIgher castes, whose co-option into the state apparatus
allowed a revitalisation of the old regime. This restructured and
consolidated regime could now, though bureaucratic expansion and
legItImate development rhetoric, directly penetrate rural society and
pursue a policy of centralisation in spite of its rhetoric to the contrary.
Thus, it is only apparently a paradox that the integration of the
mountain kingdom into the world community (accompanied by a large
influx of development assistance) enabled the regime to tap both Western
and indigenous sources of legitimacy. Donor assistance was used by the
regime to expand a bureaucracy that emulated the old patronage culture,
now flourishing on generous monetary and technical assistance. While
helping to ensure the hegemonic grip of the old autocratic regime in the
shorter run, the development assistance also had other contradictory
effects, reinforcing economic differentiation, restructuring social
disparities and transforming political consciousness of ethnic, caste and
gender-based injustices at both collective and individual levels.
While both international political developments and development
assistance in the four principal development decades (1960s to 1990s)
engendered first the seeds and later the ferment of political dissent -
centred on a Western liberal discourse on the nature of the state and
state-society relations - there was another set of national actors who
represented an alternative chorus of dissenting voices, based on Marxist-
Leninis! and Maoist political ideology. This stream of political thought,
which claimed to be scientific and of universal applicability, contained a
comprehensive set of propositions about the nature of world history, of
global/regional and national interdependencies, and thus also of Nepal's
history. Based on this political ideology, the communists had, from their
establishment of the first communist party, challenged the autocratic
monarchy and called for a constituent assembly in order to create what
they coin "the objective conditions" for a radical rupture in the old
political order and the genesis of "a new state".
This state would effectively combat gender, caste, ethnic and
regional oppression. In recognition of the importance of this growing
political movement and its regional basis, the article briefly describes the
major shifts in the institutionalisation of communism in Nepal, through
bewilderingly numerous fissions and fusions. These were at times the
results of personality-based politics and other more pragmatic postures.
But the fissions and fusions were at times the results of deep ideological
dissent, resulting in the purging of minority views.
The article eventually focuses on the sudden rise in 1990 of a
popular movement, which led to a new constitution that enshrined
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constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy. Three main lines of
argument are developed about the 1990/91 events and the following
period up to the proclamation of the insurgency. Firstly, the article
pinpoints that the cultural hegemony of the notion of Hindu monarchy
and certain international and national political constellations resulted in a
qU~lIed mass movement and an incongruous constitution. Secondly, the
article stresses the importance of 1990/91 and the following years as a
radical juncture for the communist movement in Nepal. Some of these
leftist parties became parliamentary actors. One newly merged
communist party (Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist)
turned to social democratic ideology and went into government. Three
other Maoist and outrightly republican parties, though opposed to the
constitution and the multiparty system, created first a political front (the
UnIty Centre) so as to expose tactically the inadequacies of the
parliamentary system, then later withdrew from parliamentary politics
while utilising the expanded liberties of civil society to make a~
unprecedented comeback. Thirdly, the reasons for the failure of both
leftist and rightist democratic parties to build effective coalitions around
national interests and to start institutionalising a democratic transition are
outlined. This blatant failure to embark on a road of democratisation may
be understood as much as an effect of the old regime's political and
mental grip over policy making and administration.
But, this effect led, in turn, to an intolerable disjuncture between on
th~ one hand a fennenting and spreading consciousness of political
gnevances (in a civil society invariably moulded by foreign development
aid and the communist movement) and on the other, the state's failure to
start responding to basic democratic demands, through the establishment
of accountability mechanisms. In fact, the state instead took on a
conflict-inducing and escalating role, resorting to repressive means
through the intact, authoritarian state apparatus. The constellation of
these internal conditions and in addition the ideological victory (within
the Unrty Centre) of the hardliners in favour of armed struggle left the
ground fertIle for the declaration in February 1996 by the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) of the political and military programme of a so-
called "People's War". This programme aimed at creating a mass-based
movement through first establishing so-called 'base areas' in the remote
rural areas, and then later surrounding urban areas and seizing state
t.
f
power. The Comprehensive Peace Accord of November 2006 can be
characterised as a victory for the Communist Party of Nepal (MaOIst),
though they have for pragmatic reasons conceded to a deal that is based
on liberal democratic values.
THE RISE OF THE HINDU STATE IN NEPAL
Unification and Early Consolidation during Ihe Shahs (1768-1846)
Both in the South-Indian region and Indo-Gangetic region, a number of
expansionist kingdoms rose during the medieval period. They were
organised on religions based on sophisticated textual sources, on the
culture of caste and Hinduism, and on sacred kings considered gods and
great conquerors (lnden, 1990). The rise of Hindu kingdoms in the foot
and mid-hill Himalayan region should be seen as part of these regJOn-
wide trends in state-formation. The unification of Nepal in the middle
and late eighteenth century by Prithivi Narayan Shah was based on a
combination of military force, marriage alliances between immigrants
and ethnic clites, state patronage of earlier local or regional deities,
exterminating some contending chiefly lines while offering others high-
ranking office, and promoting the migration of Hindus to tribal domains.'
As a result of the alliance between Hindu settlers and central ehtes, tnbal
lands were turned into state lands or cleared for cultivation. This resulted
in increased taxation which accrued to the state treasury.
State religion in Nepal was based on the royal lineage's religious
practices, and only this lineage was accorded the power to offer
patronage and confer state status to the state rituals. This basic notio.n ~as
also proved extremely resilient and can be discerned in the contradictIOn
(to be debated in a later subsection) between the 1990 Constitution's
stress on the one side of a sovereign Hindu monarch and descendants
from the Shah lineage's exclusive right to the kingship, and on the other
side, a multi-ethnic and religiously diverse state. This contradiction waS
sought solved at the supra-structural level by the recently (in April 2006)
reinstated House of Representatives, which claimed itself sovereIgn and
abolished Hinduism as state religion and cut deeply most of the
privileges of the kingship.
With the adoption of the Hindu notion of the king as epitomising
society and hence the embodiment of his subjects, it was natural that
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sarkar referred both to the government and the king as the embodiment
of his subjects. While the more subtle interpretation of the founder
warnOr kmg's treatise Divine Teaching (Dibya Upadesh) remains
contested, the fact that the founding statement of Nepal as a Hindu
kmgdom, a garden of four classes (varnas) and of 36 castes (jats) was
even ~ncorporated into the democratic 1990 Constitution is worth
reflect111g t¥Jon (see Shanna, 1997)7 As we will see below, the cultural
model of the monarchy as Hindu has delivered a main state-defining
feature that has proved extremely compelling in Nepalese society. This
model, expressed and legitimised in state rituals, remained virtually
uncontested until the 1920s when as we wI'11 later s II
. . ' ec, some 5ma
SOcieties started to question the legitimate basis for the kingship's divi
rule and the hierarchical caste order. ne
Closely linked to the Shahs' assimilationist and conciliatory
strategies 111 relatIOn to tribal religion, they also opted for a policy of
selective 111tegration of local lords and nobles and chiefly lines from the
heartland mto the state apparatus. The same heartland (the Western and
mId-western hills) was to become the core area of Maoist resistance in
the late twentieth century.
The Consolidated Hindu State: The Rana Era (1846-1951)
lung Bahadur of Kunwar asserted himself as a seminal figure in
Nepalese political history through the Kot massacre in 1846. Bv means
of the famous royal sanad(charter), he managed in 1856 to curt;il the de
}aclo authonty of the Shah patrilineage of Succession and established his
own patnlmeage (adopting the title of Rana) as the heirs' to the
Premlershl~, which were accorded extremely wide powers (see Uprety,
1992.3-4). Rana rule thnved during the next nearly 100 years within the
already well-established institution of divine kingship. The king as the
sovereign was the supreme dispenser of land and offices amongst others.
He was the patron of an extensive pyramid-like ritual exchange
network 10 as well as the head of command structures and of direct!
IndlreC~ polItIcal.control of remote areas, also exercising dominion over a
centralIsed taxatIOn system (based on a particular land tenure re' ).dd' . glme m
a ItlOn to monopoly trade. The centre of judicial, legislative and
executive powers was the Maharaja and his Council, who appointed and If
t
commanded the district officers (badahakims). The Ranas centralIsed the
bureaucracy even more than during the rule of the Shahs. Even minor
appointments needed the Premier's approval. A rule of annual renewal of
offices from lower-ranking offices up to Commander-in-Chief ensured a
strict upward "accountability system" based on loyalty in exchange for
patronage. This principle was matched by a principle of hereditary
succession to all major civil and military positions. The state apparatus
was thus grounded in a bureaucratic culture defined by a patronage
system that mobilised both kinship and caste principles.
The official state realm was devoid of the Western distinction
between the public and the private. At the very top was the Premier, who
after 1856 substituted in persona the erstwhile king as the head of
government (sarkar) and thus as the embodiment of all matters of
collective interest. In other words, the Ranas ruled and the Shahs reigned.
The idea of a harmonious, hierarchical order between ruler and subjects
co-existed uneasily with the ruling family's violent intra-family feuds
over the right of succession to the position of Premier. Of the ten Rana
Premiers, only four died natural deaths while in office. The others were
either assassinated or forced to abdicate (see Uprety 1992:5). The
hierarchical order was also formalised through the promulgation in 1854
of the first civil code, Muluki Ain. The promulgation of a civil code was
inspired by the rulers' exposure to the British Empire's use of
codifications. The content of the code represented an ambitious, yet
pragmatic effort to superimpose an orthodox Hindu caste structure based
on the idea of castes as qualitative species, some slaveable and other
unslaveable. Any notion of the individual was subsumed under the
concept of the collective as an ascribed category of caste. One
outstanding feature of the Code's pragmatic attitude is the middle
position conferred to tribal groups, which the Code ranked as pure castes,
both subdivided into slaveable and unslaveable. 11 This very substantial
reform is an early precursor to political refonns by successive
generations of authoritarian rulers in Nepal. Certain formal features are
borrowed from Western institutions and political language and wedded
with political notions and practices of the Hindu state, regardless of
whether these were truly rooted in Nepali society or simply imposed
through combining force with more subtle fonns of coercion.
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. The pragmatic alliance with the white, impure masters on India
soil allowed the Rana t ' , 0... S 0 pursue a foreign policy of strict isolation. This
pol~cy sUited well the central nation-building objective of reinforcing a
notIOn of Nepal as a uniq t' I' ,, ue na IOn 0 the ritually pure, In addition th
p:hcy --:- whether intentionally or not - practically isolated the elite' an~
t e subjugated multl-ethmc population and lower castes from direct
exposure to 200 years of dramatic political upheavals that led eventually~o political a~d ~ndus~nal revolutions in the Western world. l :! The full
Impact of thiS IsolatIOnist policy is impossible to 11 'satisfactory h b ... spc out In anyf manner ere, ut the Implications for political imaginations
o governance and economic development seem noticeable even until
very recently,
d IThe end of the Rana period has been characterised by contemporary
an atcr commentators as the end of conspiratorial violent politics in
Nepal~ B~t the exceptionally unclear circumstances surroundin the~:assmatlOn of the royal couple and their nearest kin in June 20g1 do
make It unr~a.sonable to question whether this conclusion is
premature, The political culture (institutionalised for more than 150
of Shah a d RI) , , yearsr ~ ,ana ru e with ItS underlying models of the public order of~entra Ise Hmdu state religion, and of loyalty based on patronage ~nd
laVOUrltlsm would also pro 'I'
th I
, fr ve very res] lent against later efforts to refonn
e po Ity om above.
~~~:~~~RUCTUREDHINDU STATE IN THE TWENTIETH
The Early Post-Rana Period
The formal ending of Rana rule in Nepal was due to a a'~~cumstantial constellation of global, regional and domestic c:nd~;~ou~:r
, e recruitment of Gurkhas ' ] into the British Indian Army led to ~
simmering political consciousness about the political e' 'NTh G kh ' , , r glme m epal
, e ur a s participation in the two World Wars and their st t' , 'm IndIa d' h
' a IOnmgunng t e most decisive years of the Indian N t' "Movement f' a Iona 1St
C
. .' :vas 0 particular importance for their earliest political
onSClentlsatlOn. After the . . .of G kh Y were penSIOned, a not mSlgnificant number
dd
' ur as refused, partly on political grounds, to resettle in Nepal In
a ItlOn to the ex-Gurkh II
'
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stayed in India due to family connections and higher studies were also
groomed politically in the Nationalist Movement. They came to form the
core of the small anti-Rana groups, The victory of the Liberation
Movement in 1947, the subsequent withdrawal of the British and the
instalment of the first post-independence government created a new
political situation in Nepal. The Ranas were deprived of their old
colonial ally and found themselves with a neighbouring government
which had every reason to dislike the Ranas, who through the supply of
Gurkha soldiers had directly helped the British to maintain their empire,
Internal dissent over succession in the rapidly expanding Rana family
helped to weaken the Ranas' ability to close the ranks in this new
international situation (see Uprety 1992:5),
While some anti-Rana activities had already taken place in India in
the 1920s and 1930s, J4 the 1940s brought a rapid growth in political
activity, which included one assassination attempt. This was discovered.
Some of those implicated were punished by execution and thereby
became the first martyrs for the democratic cause, In the late 1940s the
Nepali National Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal were
fanned. When Nepal experienced its first incipient civil disobedience
movement, the erstwhile Rana Prime Minister found it necessary to
undertake some limited reforms15 so as to cope in the new international
situation. These steps generated an internal backlash, leading to the
resignation of the Prime Minister (Padma Shamsher) and a ban on the
recently formed Nepali Congress Party, To appease the new Indian
government, the Ranas let the Indians use Nepalese troops during the
Hyderabad and Kashmir crisis and accepted, in 1950, a Treaty on Trade
and Commerce and another on Peace and Friendship (see Shaha,
1990b:195), The latter treaty made Nepal an integrated part of India's
security policy, The Trade Treaty opened Nepal up for Indian economic
interests on very unequal tenns and laid the basis for a growing Indian
domination of the Nepalese economy in the 1960s and 1970s, with
profound long-tenn consequences for Nepal's subsistence economy and
the poverty situation, With the influx of industrial goods like manufac-
tured cloth (augmented later in the 1960s by farm implements and
household utensils), the artisan and service occupations of Nepal'S
numerically large service castes were undermined, Also, the import of
Indian food items, such as a large variety of spices and salt (the salt trade
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with Tibet was made impossible by the Chinese occupation in 1959),
altered the viability of particular occupations and economic institutions
amongst some of the ethnic groups.
Already in 1951, the Communist Party for the first time demanded
the drafting of a new constitution by a constituent assembly. This
demand was voiced during the following 50 years by a number of
communist actors, including the current Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist), which waged a war against the "semi-feudal" state until 2006,16
The actual significance of the Shah royal family in anti-Rana
activities in the 1930s, 1940s and in the Ranas' ultimate downfall in 1950
is disputed (see Shrestha, 1984:121; Brown, 1996:14-22), In November
1950, the king and other royal family members sought asylum at the
Indian embassy in Kathmandu, The royals were later flown to India, The
circumstances surrounding the royal family's flight reveal both India's
direct and indirect roles in the ousting of the Ranas' rule. As we will
repeatedly observe over the next five decades, India was ambivalent in
its strategic postures towards its northern neighbour. The Congress's
armed resistance movement, Mukti Sena,17 received only limited support
from the Indians, who feared the immediate effects of an unstable
northern frontier however much they wanted a more palatable rule in
Nepal (Rose 1971), IS Delhi doubted the Congress's capability as a
prospective ruling party, and feared the Congress's collaboration with the
Nepali Communist Party at the time of the communist takeover in China,
Consequently, they went for a carefully guided transition based on a so-
called power-sharing arrangement through a coalition government of the
Ranas, the kingship and the Congress (see Rose 1971:194),
The Delhi Settlement of 1951 was largely fonned by Delhi's
pragmatic strategic interest. The Settlement, or Delhi Compromise as it
was also called, can only be said to have been a compromise of a
cosmetic kind, since the Congress was mostly excluded from the real
political negotiations, There was certainly a reshuming of the power-
sharing arrangements between the Shah family and the Rana family,
Somewhat more political power was yielded to the kingship and the king
in persona, whilst the Ranas' dominance within the palace administration
and the anny was mostly left intact The consequence of the Delhi
Compromise could be seen as highly influential for the political
development in Nepal until the present. The autocratic state centred on
the institution of kingship was largely left intact The tenn "intact" is
purposely used here to underline the fact that the institution of kingship
as a form of reign could survive a century of Rana political "foot-
binding", The Ranas very cleverly did not interfere with the traditional
and effective modes of publicising and exercising kingly authority
through patronage of a number of national religious festivals and temple
institutions situated both in the capital valley and throughout the rugged
countryside (see Bleie and Bhattarai, 2002),
After the Delhi Settlement, the Congress's room for manoeuvre to
bargain for any real democratisation was severely limited. The regime
was, in other v\lords, intact. Only the partly co-opted and inexperienced
Congress Party gave the new government an aura of democratic
legitimacy, The Delhi Settlement was largely made by Indian actors in
New Delhi, some of whom had multiple economic, kinship-based and
ideological links to the Shah and Rana contenders, The "compromise"
provided new political capital to the king, who could return to
Kathmandu in triumph, declaring his commitment to building democracy
in Nepal,
This Royal Declaration, like later political statements from
Congress politicians, was of a rhetorical nature. The composition of the
old elite was intact The practice of marriage alliances between the Shahs
and the Ranas continued, as did the customary patronage practices of
giving positions within the bureaucracy to clients, kinsmen and other
allies, Though some of the traditional privileges and power bases of the
Ranas and Shahs were undennined or abolished outright, they
successfully expanded into new sectors of the Indian and Nepalese
economies. 19 The India-groomed Congress, superficially victorious,
actually lacked a popular countrywide support base and proved itself
incapable of bringing the Kathmandu-based anti-Rana intellectuals into
the party echelons (see loshi & Rose, 1966:123-124), The Koirala
brothers were in the top leadership, B, P, Koirala wanted a real
dismantling of the Rana state, while M, P, Koirala had strong royalist
leanings, M, P, Koirala is representative of the great majority of the
1950s generation of leadership which was accultured in India and had
internalised the Sanscritic world view of divine kingship and a
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hierarchcial social order of rulers and ruled. Neither the palace
administration nor the incipient bureaucracy, or any other central social
or political institutions, nurtured cultural ideas and practices which could
act as catalysts toward a democratic political culture. To be sure, political
statements could be heard that carried a new aura of liberal political
aspirations. But neglecting to initiate anything akin to modern party-
building from grass-roots constituencies, the newly groomed Congress
leaders and aspiring leaders resorted to traditional modes of patronage
and political decision-making which suited the invigorated kingship very
well. The outcome was an empowered king who the Congress hoped
would be a balancing agent against disgruntled Rana elements. The king
and his courtiers had more ambitious intentions than the Congress hoped,
and they succeeded in acquiring considerable power over the indecisive
and disunited party.
This set of developments led to a series of short-lived governments
bent on internal rivalries, unchecked by any popular party-based or
electoral accountability. The king appointed M. P. Koirala to the position
as Prime Minister twice in 1952/53. Both this and other offices were
handed out as gestures of royal benevolence and patronage, not as
appointments based on any popular mandate. Benefiting individuals in
their turn became empowered and capacitated to dispense their own
extended patronage. During this period, the traditional elite fonned their
own pressure groups. The Communist Party was banned in 1955. The
party continued underground to influence some permitted civil rights
organisations and, more importantly, it started to build a cadre base in
some parts of the western and eastern hills. In these western hills
(Pyuthan, Rolpa and Rukum), the Maoist insurgency would start about
five decades later. Already in those early years of party-building, the
communists were ideologically divided over the role of the monarchy in
Nepal (Brown, 1996:27).
As the king expanded his power base and the array of short-lived
governments provoked disillusionment with so-called democracy, the
king abandoned his promise of a constituent assembly and in 1954
proclaimed that supreme power was to be vested with the kingship (see
Shaha, 1990:303-305). These moves between 1951 and 1953 have
certain parallels with the 1991-1999 period (see discussion below). The
1955 successor to the throne, King Mahendra, was bent on consolidating
monarchical absolutism. The elections promoted earlier were postponed
and the administration reorganised to facilitate the ambitious monarch's
direct control and patronage.20
During the post-Rana period, novel avenues for political careers
opened up. The new build-up of bureaucratic institutions, also aided by
the influx of development funds, resulted in an increase in both political
and bureaucratic offices. 21 This led to new opportunistic competition for
offices and influence. Also during this period, Indian influence and to
some degree outright interference in domestic affairs continued and
inevitably provoked growing anti-Indian sentiment. To provide a thin
fal'ade of democratisation, the ban on the Communist Party was lifted in
1956. This lifting paved the way for a joint campaign with the Congress
for elections. After years of internal scrambles, the Congress managed in
1956 to consolidate a socialist platfonn. Despite the parties' successful
pressure for an election, they were not able to stop the king from
promulgating a new constitution directly and dishonouring the demand
for a constituent assembly. The new 1959 Constitution vested all
juridical and executive power in the king. Nevertheless, the appointment
of the experienced B. P. Koirala on the basis of the 1959 elections led to
a brief period of incipient democratisation under Koirala's unifying
leadership.
The Aborted Democratisation under B. P. Koirala
B. P. Koirala's appointment was a pragmatic compromise, but the
palace's cool reception shifted to staunch resistance when the king felt
threatened by the emerging prospect of new, Western (democratic)
accountability structures based on an elected parliament. During this
phase, the communists (who took a strong pro-Chinese stand) led a fairly
effective opposition in the parliament (see Brown, 1996:34). The B. P.
Koirala government, with its recently adopted socialist programme,
started promoting the concept of an interventionist state which should
deliver basic services, run economic enterprises and uphold an
independent judiciary. This new programme led to certain land refonns
and to an early effort to institute an independent judiciary. The Koirala
60 Occasional Papers, Vol10 TONE BLEIE . The Decades 01 VOIten! Deslabilizallon 'In Nepal
61
government mostly succeeded in the precarious balancing act of
maintaining fairly good Indo-Nepali and Sino-Nepali relations."
The not insignificant gains of the B. P. Koirala government during
its early period gave Koirala a growing popularity and authority. The
government' 5 early effort to institutionalise a more independent
bureaucracy threatened to marginalise the palace-based administration
and the traditional patronage-based politics (See loshi and Rose,
1966:386; Rose and Scholz, 1989:48). In December 1960, the Prime
Minister and his cabinet were arrested. The constitution was suspended
and direct palace-based rule instituted. The conspicuous lack of public
resistance from the smaller parties, the traditional elite and the upper
echelons of the bureaucracy against the royal ousting of an elected
government shows just how profoundly the patronage-based political
culture permeated these public institutions. Also importantly, the
international community did not strongly condemn King Mahendra's
move. The ousting of the government and the ban on the party led
Congress members to start a resistance movement in India. This
movement could not muster enough support for conducting raids on
Nepal's soil that would represent any real military challenge to the
regime. The Indian endorsement of the insurgent activities on their side
of the border was soon withdrawn, on account of the Sino-Indian border
conflict in particular, which altered Himalayan geopolitics.
During the 1950s and the first years of the 1960s, the monarchy
quite effectively managed to manipulate and contain the incipient seeds
of democratic transition. With some level of credibility, the king could
denounce parliamentary democracy as a foreign import. Instead, the
monarch announced the establishment of the four-tiered Panchayat
system (underpinned by a new constitution), which he claimed would be
based on Nepalese political culture. 23 In addition, the regime - inspired
both by Maoist ideology and by the Nepalese notion of unity in the
public order - instituted class organisations (bargiya sangatban) for
fanners, women, youth and fonner servicemen. These organisations were
seen as representing private interest groups which were entitled to
nominate some representatives to the National Assembly.24 Other private
interest organisations needed government approval to enter public space
or were banned altogether (i.e., the communists) from the same space.
As Burghart (1994: 1-14) has pinpointed, the 1962 Constitution
contains a striking contradiction. On the one hand, it was to constitute
political relations between the king and his people in harmony with the
traditional order. On the other hand, the constitution was a modem legal
means by which a remoulded political culture was to be created. The
Panchayat system represented certain novel organisational forms (such as
the class-based organisations"), but tapped into and expanded local and
supra-local traditional forms of political authority favouring men from
the highest castes. Local and central public arenas revolved around
chains of chiefly and royal authority. The Rana-instituted governance
practice of mobile official tours (daudaha) was revived. The monarch
held annual audiences (darshan) in the zonal and district centres and
accepted salami, the ritual offering (similar to the offering of gifts to
deities in temples) of a coin to the royal authority in appreciation for
being appointed to a public offlce.26 The practice of pajani, the annual
renewal of offices, was also given new emphasis by the royal authority.
These public practices were also expressive of the royals' full control
over any legitimate expression of public service.:'.7
All these engagements were guided by a notion of public order
defined through unity, ultimately vested in the institution of kingship.
This notion was different from the Western notion of public order as a
negotiating space for diverse, partly conflicting, partly converging
personal interests. Thus, in Nepal dissent and conflict were by and large
not pennitted.
Nation-building efforts (desa banaune) during the Panchayat years
showed how contested and incomplete the project was. A language
policy issue such as the role of regional languages in education and mass
communication was highly contested already in the 1950s. This and other
language issues reappeared soon in political debate. In 1962, Nepali was
made the sole medium of instruction in all state schools, and broadcasts
in Hindi and Newari were t<nninated on Radio Nepal in 1965." By a
combination of statistical and rhetorical means, Nepali was made the
only official language and the Nepalese, claimed to be "one people".
Similar means were used to construct the common religious identity
the Hindu kingship needed for its legitimate reign. A notion of the Hindu
nation could be forged by manipulating the number of Hindus in the
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1961 Census. As an accommodation to international human rights norms,
the state officially abolished the caste system. The regime thus had to
resort to the vague claim of being the defender of "local tradition".
Undoubtedly, such a stance indirectly lent legitimacy to the still
entrenched caste system, which the same regime had recently officially
abolished.
While some progressive refonns were enshrined in policies and the
1962 Constitution,29 and the somewhat reformed governance system
gave the appearance of separated executive, judicial and legislative
branches, appointments and promotions and dismissals were handled by
the expanded sovereign authority of the king. As Hayes has noted (See
Hayes, 1975:616-628), the monarch skilfully managed to combine
tapping two sources of legitimacy, the traditional Hindu kingly authority
and the Western notions of representative democracy. Direct elections
were only held at the village assembly level. Here the segments of the
population with high ritual status and landed property dominated the
assemblies. If popular accountability at that level was variable it was
minimal at higher levels of the indirectly elective system. At the' centre
the parliament endorsed formally decisions already made by the Central
Secretariat - the apex of royal authority. As comprehensive civil
liberties were forbidden, the regime committed human rights violations.
However, the ruler's alliance-building and patronage of the police, army
a~d rural and urban elites was successful towards preventing excessive
dIrect use of violent oppression. Internal criticism within the system was
contained by intermittently approving certain minor reorganisations. The
expanding middle class was kept politically inactive by providing its
members \vith new economic opportunities that also gave social status.
Of principal importance were job opportunities within the government
and the aid sector, which started to grow in the 1960s and virtuallv
exploded in the following two decades. The disillusioned and exiled
Congress experienced in the 1960s a considerable stream of defections'
many entered the ranks of the Panchayat institutions, indicating thei;
opportunistic power-seeking motivations. JO
Opportunism towards being able to rule and divide also
characterised the royal authority's official and unofficial dealings with
the banned lefbst parties in this period. The communists (divided into
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pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow factions) were not considered as real a
contender for power as was the Congress. The Beijing faction was thus
assisted in order to undermine the Congress's support-base. The
Panchayat regime also received considerable aid from the Maoist
Chinese regime. As the communists gained in influence, the palace
shifted sides and started to be more liberal to the Congress. Amongst
others, political prisoners (including the aging and ailing B. P. Koirala)
were released. The 1971 elections to the Panchayat and class
organisations showed popular discontent with the system (Brown,
1996:50). Moreover, Himalayan geopolitics again changed in the 1970s
as communist China's international position became weaker. The king,
who had considered the Chinese regime his closest ally, increasingly had
to recognise that his southern neighbour was a contender for the position
as a regional superpower.
The Middle and Late Panchayat Period
During the late Panchayat period, the hierarchical social structure
underwent certain changes, but without offering opportunities for upward
mobility for individual women or for individuals from the previous
untouchable castes and most of the ethnic groups. The mechanisms for
upward mobility and incipient class formation were based on formal
education, particularly favouring Brahmin men with proper command
over a Sanskritised Nepali. The new employment opportunities in the
government were snatched not only by Brahmins, but also by Chhetri
and Newari men - all /Tom caste groups from the hill region which had
earlier dominated the bureaucracy.
Since the bureaucracy in the 1970s and 1980s also expanded very
rapidly at local levels, it gave ill-informed outsiders the impression of an
increasingly decentralised administration with enhanced capacity to
function as a redistributive state apparatus. The expansion of government
offices at regional, zone and district levels was changing state-society
relations, but not in a manner conducive to democratic constitutional
notions of impartibility, separation of the three cardinal functions of
government and of local self-governance. Instead, donor-dependent
growth let to an unprecedented expansion of the centralised patrimonial
state, within which the extra-constitutional political centre (the Central
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Palace Secretarial) demanded loyalty from the upper echelons of a
satellite-like and steadily growing bureaucracy. High caste patronage
cuhure, consisting of a complex set of behavioural codes and practices
including favouritism and "bribery", was extended down to the lower
grades of civil servants and out\\lards to the newly fonned rural
administrative tiers. In the 1980s, a court dialect used by the Rana
aristocracy in the previous century on social occasions was the routine
fonn of address among civil servants when signalling and negotiating
status and role expectations (see Pandey, 1989:326).
The Palace Secretariat had managed to get a constitutional basis for
their control over all policy decisions.ll This was a fateful structural
incongruity which crippled proactive policy-making and implementation
from the level of ministers down to top bureaucrats and below, as all
were vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal not on grounds of incompetence
but because of either a failure to show sufficient loyalty (chakari) or the
top patrons' shifting alliances and subsequent changes of incumbents.
The rapid in nux of aid money into such a patronage-based usury system
led to a redefinition of the well-established and morally accepted system
of "bribery" and chakari as well as to increased outright embezzlement
offunds.32
The rapid and soon heavy dependence on donor aid (especially
bilateral aid), which in this period covered not only a substantial portion
of development expenditure but also the state's administrative expenses,
created a new category of patrons. These external Western patrons had
their own notions of good governance and accountability structures
which the ruling Nepali politicians and bureaucrats had to please. The
accommodation of two outrightly different political notions and
institutional practices, one inner life based on age-old notions of
dispensing patronage in exchange for loyalty by personalised idioms and
one outer life for the donor community and the intemational community,
necessitated a sophisticated art of impression management and (self)
deception. Administrative refonns, including a number of technical
assistance programmes, were enacted but, to the dismay of the donors,
with limited effects on the efficiency and quality of the administration,
its service delivery and development efforts. Ironically, the Palace
Secretariat, the centre of political power and the chief producer of the
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caste and patronage-based values and go\Cming style. was overlooked in
these refonn efforts.J) The very structure and function of lhe
administrative and political system operated according to very different
"unwritten" institutional rules, which I have brieny described and
analysed above. In order to accommodate the donors' urgings for results,
another strategy for quasi-solution of the administrative impasse was the
establishment of parallel institutions (such as Development Boards),
which had their own rules, regulations and salal)' structure.
In the 19705, it was all too evident that the much-debated and long-
awaited land refonn (enacted in 1964) had done little to change the
inequalities in size of landholdings (see Zaman. 1992; Riedinger, 1993).
In the hills, the growing livelihood crisisl4 was, to some degree,
mitigated by migration to the low· lying fertile Terai. This plain region
had become a malaria-free zone with American aid. The state's biased
land allotment policy and resettlement schemes in the Terai led to a
reproduction of the hills upper-caste social order in the Terni (Shrestha
and Conway, 1985). Temporary migration to India and to the cities also
acted as safety valves in the crisis-ridden hill communities. The donor-
financed constru~ion ofsome roads starting in Ihe 1960s and continuing
in the 1970s facilitated a rapid innux of Indian manufactured goods. This
led in the first place to the rapid expansion of rural markets thriving on
selling manufactured goods and then to urbanisation, mainly in the Terai
and in Pokhara and Kathmandu valley. These developments then affected
the social structure, undemlining the traditional interdependency between
the service castes and high castes. Since no alternative slate-sponsored
social safety net was in place. and caste discrimination still barred these
people from entering the expanding and profitable non-agricultural
sector, their livelihood situation deteriorated further. As smallholders,
these sections (whose composirion in terms ofethnic affiliation and caste
status varied considerably) had marginal access to the material rewards
from the large and moslly bilaterally financed development projects,
such as the USAID Rapti Zone Integrated Development Project. Both the
rhetoric of "a right to development" and "poverty alleviation" espoused
by these development agents, as well as "class-based justice" articulated
by the communists sowed the early seeds of what would fennent in the
19805 and 1990s into a widespread subjective political consciousness of
grievance and relative deprivation. The Maoist rebellion would come to
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start from some of the districts under the Rapti Zone (Rolpa, Rukum and
Pyuthan).
The new King Birendra, in spite of his Western elite education,
continued his predecessor's authoritarian political line. The Congress
remained banned and the leaders exiled. The precariously forged unity
was disturbed by a number of violent attacks,35 the most consequential in
retrospect being the Jhapa Uprising in 1971. The uprising showed the
regional link of the outlawed Maoist Communist Party to the Communist
Party of India (Marxist), which started the Naxalite movements in Bihar
and West Bengal. Only the border river Mechi separates Jhapa from the
epicentre of the movement, Naxalbari. The Naxalites' practice of so-
called revolutionary justice was taken up by young Jhapa activists, and
some local landlords were murdered in the way of executions. While the
uprising was brutally quelled by the government, it was politically
mobilising and led to the formation in Jhapa of the All Nepal Communist
Coordination Committee, which started forming local groups. Such class
justice came more than 20 years later, to be taken up on a large scale by
the Maoist Movement.
During the deteriorating political situation under Indira Gandhi, the
exiled B. P. Koirala (then President of the Nepali Congress) returned to
Nepal in a proclaimed effort to contribute to national reconciliation after
India's threatening (with Nepalese eyes) annexation of the Himalayan
kingdom Sikkim in 1975. Koirala's cult-like position was not sufficient
political capital for any revitalisation of the party, though there was some
opposition to the regime. The execution of Pakistan's Prime Minister
Zulfikar AIi Bhutto was an opportune catalyst for public demonstrations,
again shattering the precariously forged unity of public life. The
spreading demonstrations were also indirectly protests against the
execution of the persons convicted for the assassination attempt on
Birendra a few years earlier. This spontaneous unrest led the royal
authority to proclaim a referendum to decide the future of the Panchayat
system. The referendum in May 1980 resulted in a small but significant
majority voting in favour of the Panchayat system. The result may be
interpreted as the outcome of pragmatic support for a reformed
Panchayat system, a lack of trust in the political parties and the panchas'
massive economic expenditure to promote their campaign. In addition,
the Congress and the communists failed to see the importance of building
an inter-party alliance to win the referendum (see Brown, 1996:91).
B. P. Koirala's disastrously poor judgement during his final years,
which nevertheless did not lead to his removal as elected leader, shows
how strong the culture of respect towards elders continued to be in the
political domain. This culture would, as we shall see again, become
conspicuous as we move to consider the Congress leadership of the
1990s.
Between 1983 and 1990, the Nepalese communist movement was
riddled by ideological differences and personality-based conflict. J6 The
movement and its ideological debates and struggles occurred in India,
where many of the activists worked and studied.
As Brown among others has pointed out, there was a confined
political liberalisation after the 1980 referendum. Among the reform
measures were election of the Prime Minister by the National Assembly
and the introduction of the adult franchise. But these measures were
accompanied by an expansion of the royal authority's extra-
constitutional sources of power.37
The inadequate understanding by the powerful donor community in
Nepal of state-society relations and its reductionist perception of good
governance as a matter of refonns and building technical capacity, and
poverty as a result of demographic explosion causing an environmental
crisis, diverted attention away from the two critically interdependent core
issues. These were (I) the elite's centralised control of the state
apparatus, and (2) the distributional aspects of the poverty issue. The
latter issue would have put land reform and the management of water and
other bio-resources centre stage (World Bank, 1988).
While the political pressure increased during the 1980s, the overall
livelihood situation remained poor. According to a conservative World
Bank estimate, about 50 percent of the population faced chronic or
seasonal food deficits (World Bank, 1991), and a very large proportion of
the children were stunted. Regional imbalances in food production and
life expectancy were also considerable (World Bank, 1990). Gender
discrimination remained pervasive, as Nepali women remained among
the most overworked, undervalued and politically excluded of all the
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world's women - despite more than a decade of women-targeted
policies and programmes.
THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE TO THE HINDU STATE
People's Rebellion: The Seeds ofa Revolution Betrayed
In latc 1989, the controversy over the lndo-Nepali Trade and Transit
Treaty was unresolved. The urban population in particular felt the
repercussions of the dispute and the ensuing trade boycott. Incorporated
into the global electronic news network, the Nepalese received radio and
television news about how people's power in Eastern Europe could
ovenhrow oppressive dictatorships. People's imaginations were receptive
to these media-sent ideological messages.JI The Nepalese audience could
also observe through the international media how people could
concretely organise for political change. In early 1990, a loose alignment
was established by a bloc named the United Left Front (ULF), composed
of seven leftist parties, and the Congress Party.J9 A number of other
small leftist parties decided al this stage of fight separately, but in
collusion with the Congress and ULF, The anti-regime protests (Jana
Andolan I) ~tarted on a highly symbolic and official day, Nepal's
Democracy Day, J8 February,
The outburst of increasing crowds of agitators in a public domain
based on a model of harmony and consensus was first met by the regime
with a certain degree of repression. The regime also resorted to the well-
known recipe of undermining (the movement's) credibility by playing on
anti-Indian sentiments. Limited concessions were not considered at this
stage. During the build·up and climactic stages of the movement, the
police violated not only human rights but also indigenous moral codes of
conduct, leading to stronger ami-government reactions.4o The protests
initially grew and waned. Then the demonstrations grew in spurts as the
protests spread to all the towns of Kathmandu Valley and later to the
towns in the Terai, culminating in bloody confrontations with the police
in April. Alongside a curfew, the monarch gave some concessions, such
as lifting the ban on political parties.
The nearly exclusive urban and mostly middle-class foundation of
the protest movement, no doubt mirroring the centralised nature of state
power in Nepal, would prove to have major consequences for the
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outcome of the movement. As it grew and the regime's oppressive
apparatus was felt not only by more people but by new types of
demonstrators (including educated professionals not accustomed to face
direct brutal repression), anti-royalist attitudes gained ground.41 As
Brown among others has argued, the widely circulated accounts claiming
that the well-meaning King Birendra was manipulated during those
critical weeks by his courtiers are highly dubious. The king and his inner
circle of advisors must to some extent have underestimated the popular
momentum of the movemenl.4! Following the climax of bloody clashes
caused by indiscriminate firing by the security forces on 6 April, the
palace, for reasons not fully known, did not Opl for a major clampdown
by the well-equipped and royalist army. Instead, the regime opted for a
negotiated "compromise".
The selS of conditions that led the leadership of the Congress-ULF
alliance to opt for a compromise are too complex to be given proper
scrutiny here. Congress and communist activists shared common
experiences of exile, imprisonment, insurgency and unpredictable palace
politics. Nevertheless, the alliance was frail from the start and was
riddled with ideological and personal differences, disparate party cultures
and varying credibility in royal and international circles. The Nepali
Congress had a history beyond that ofa banned opposition party. It had
in certain periods been a partner-in-government (see the above political
history betv.'een 1951-1990). Therefore, the palace saw the Congress as a
more obvious negotiating partner than the more overtly anti-monarchist
leftist parties in the alliance.
At that time, the outrightly anti-monarchist leftist parties which had
not joined ULF started to play an increasingly prominent role in the
rebellion. It showed signs of momentum as a mass movement with a
broadening support base. These developments worried leading Congress
activists who were royalists and had no ambition to let loose a revolution
that would dismantle the entire power structure of Nepalese society.
The popular mass demonstrations gained momentum in a public
domain structured on a model of non·dissent and the unifying unique
person of the king. However, at this moment no full-fledged political
programme for democratic transition from an absolute monarchy to a
responsive. pluralist secular state was worked out. Such basic neglect
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would prove very influential indeed. Without such a political
programme, one on an ad hoc basis instead relied on slogan-like claims
for a constitutional monarchy and electoral democracy. This ad hoc
strategy revealed more fundamental shortcomings of the lead party of the
United Left Front, Nepali Congress, party's organisation and culture. Its
organisational culture was based on principles of patronage, respect for
seniority, caste status and opportunism. Elections to leading offices were
not based on any proper democratic accountability structure and rules,
which were so basic to a cadre-based party culture. With many of the
senior Congress politicians under arrest, the second layer of leaders, who
had not been permitted to gain solid political experience by their detained
patrons, found themselves suddenly in charge of the challenging task of
steering 3n escalating movement in collaboration with the more militant
and experienced communists. This created alann among both the
aspiring leadership as \vell as the senior Congress leaders. Without
consultation with the communist leaders, the Congress leaders brokered
the compromise with the palace.
As noted, the very outburst of and organisational form of the
People's Movement reveals Nepal's recent integration into a globalised
electronic network. The international media's subsequent reporting of the
movement helped create some degree of international support and a
certain pressure on the government. The diplomatic community in Nepal
also exerted pressure on the discredited government and maintained
contact with the ULF. Some diplomatic missions seem to have
specifically engaged themselves. According to Brown, US officials
actively encouraged Congress leaders to reach a compromise with the
palace that included the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in
order to contain the growing leftist influence in Nepal.43 The American
position was again reiterated in strong language when the Congress Party
supremo Ganesh Man Singh visited the Bush administration in December
1990 in order to muster support (see Thapa and Sinjapati, 2003 :36).
The relative importance of other international, albeit regional actors
is more difficult to assess. The Indian coalition government as internally
divided on this issue. One of the coalition partners, Janata Dal, had for
quite some time been supportive of pro-democratic forces in Nepal. The
religious Bharatiya Janata Party was a strong supporter of the Hindu
monarchy. In order to balance these opposing stances, the government
officially stressed a policy of a middle course, but this official posture
may not represent the entire picture.44
The compromise prevented Jana Andolan from becoming a national
movement, supported by the country's oppressed population of small
peasants, low castes, many of the ethnic communities, and rural women.
More conservative political leaders with loyalist inclinations hoped the
deal would give them full access to the state through new political
channels. To them a compromise with the old regime, however
opportunist, patronage-ridden and anti-democratic, appeared to be a
much safer solution than an unpredictable alliance with the more
extremist left groups, which wanted a new social order and a "new state".
The April bloodshed and deal brokered was followed by the
establishment of an interim government and a period of prolonged
negotiations between the newly elected leaders, political parties and
palace. The new government" was to lead the nation through a difficult
transitional period, during which democratic legislation would be
fonnulated, a free press created, general elections held and the volatile
law and order situation controlled. In addition, the ne\v coalition cabinet
promised to curb corruption and to strengthen the judiciary which was
asked to investigate human rights abuses during the Jana Andolan. The
cabinet also promised to start redressing discrimination against women
and ethnic communities. The agenda was, in other words, tall indeed, and
included many of the grievances voiced by the more radical sections of
the Jana Andolan.
During the following months, the interim government showed a
limited ability to follow its own directives, provoking strong criticism
from the more radical sections of the UPF and civil society. This lack of
political ability- perhaps also of will - revealed the highly problematic
tenns of the "compromise" with the regime, a concession which leading
actors within the donor community in Nepal actively supported. The aid
community in Nepal at that time predominantly held a neo-liberal
understanding of a lean(er) Nepalese state in addition to a greater role for
the market and civil society actors, in order to generate growth. They
were, therefore, unreceptive to the left's political programme of
dismantling the elite's parasitic grip on the state by instituting republican
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rule, which could have cleared the ground for an active redistributive
state that could intervene with the market forces. It remains uncertain
whether the donor community fully contemplated the regime-conserving
and conflict-escalating impact of their stance.
The old regime was more or less intact. Yet, some of its supporting
pillars showed signs of fl"3cturing. The political establishment was
divided over the need for political reforms, hardliner pallchas stood
against liberal pancJras (with Congress sympathies). They were
nevertheless still unitcdly opposed 10 any radical legislation that could
threaten the interests of the old elite and the middle class. The Congress
leaders, including the Interim Prime Minister, saw the institution of
monarchy as the very essence of the Nepalese nation and believed that it
was possible to steer a transition from an absolute to a constitutional
monarchy (see Brown 1996:147·149). In order to try 10 save "hate.. er
could be sa\'oo of the legitimacy of King Birendra and to shore up the
institution of monarchy, no legal action was taken against the senior civil
and police officials whom two human rights commissions held ultimately
responsible for the human rights abuses during the Panchayat and the
Jana Andolan.4/l
The culturally unquestioned belief in the Hindu monarchy, resulting
111 a fear of strong influence from the republican left, might largely
explain the Congress's and other leading stakeholders' rejection of the
demand for a constituent assembly to draw up the new constitution. As
shown above, this demand has repeatedly been raised by the communists
since they first formed the party. We will come back below to why this
demand was to become probably the main reason for the Maoists'
withdrawal from the final rounds ofnegolia!ions in both 2001 and 2003.
The Contradictions in tbe 1990 Constitution
Different versions of the new constitution were drafted, showing the
ongoing struggle between the king's unwavering will to remain the
source of sovereignty and the democratic alliance.41 The commission also
invited inputs from the political parties and the general public and sent a
lawyer to study other relevant cases of constitutional monarchy. The
majority of suggestions concerned regional, religious, linguistic. gender
and ethnic issues; in other words, issues of how 10 accommodate
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differences into a state monopolised by the high caste men for centuries.
The commission and the govemment chose largely to overlook these
suggestions. denouncing them as a threat to the nation state's unity. :ne
leader ofthe commission, Justice Bishwanath Upadhayaya, charactensed
mosl of them as "unfonunate" and "peripheral" issues that revealed the
general lack of constitutional knowledge among the citizenry (Hun,
199436).
The 1990 Constitution. as will be discussed below, represents in
some respects a real advance compared to the earlier constitutions, ~n
establishing a democratic order in Nepal. But it was, as we have seen 111
several earlier examples in the post-Rana period, the result of a
"compromise" of a kind that contained some irreconcilable
contradictions. These would prove more disruptive than many
stakeholders foresaw al the lime.
One such contradiction is bet\\-'een the statement in Article 3 that the
sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the Nepali people and the emergency
powers admitted to the king in Article 115. Previous constitut~on~ fro~
1959 and 1962 had given the king the right to revoke the constItutiOns 111
their entirety and to assume all powers of government. Indeed, King
Mahendra used this provision in 1962 to oust the elected government of
B. P. Koirala. The article in the 1990 Constirution says that a
proclamation must be ratified by the House of Representatives within
three months. The constitution does not provide strong safeguards
against the king's suspension of the elected parliament during an
emergency situation. Commentators have held that the constitution's
statement (Article 3) that '"His Majesty is the symbol of the Nepalese
nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people" reinterprets the role of
the king from an autocrat to a constitutional monarch, especially since
Ihe fonnulation is connected to the provision that executive powers lie
with the Prime Minister. This interpretation becomes highly problematic
if we also consider the symbolic attributes of the king's person, as stated
in Article 27(1) and the provision of emergency powers to him.
The much awaited and debated issues of defining the core attributes
of the Nepali nation was "resolved" by the following contradictory
statement in Article 4(1): Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual,
democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu, constitutional
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ki~gdom.4R The new constitution, in other words, reaffirmed Nepal as a
Hindu state, founded on the institution of monarchy. This fundamental
concept was also affirmed by Article 27(1), wbich stated that the king
had to be a descendant of the Shah King that unified the nation a
maintainer of Aryan culture and a Hindu. The strongly articula;ed
dC~lands from ~thnic groups and the regional party for recognition of
theIr cultur~1 .flghts were thus largely unmct. The constitution gives
somew~at Imllted recognition to mother tongues as national languages
(rashlnya bhasha) and to a right to run schools that can provide
educatIOn In the mother tongue at the primary level. The regional
Sadbhavana Party"s demand for Hindi as a second state language was not
met: only Nepali was given status as the state language.
Another defining feature of the Hindu king \vas his right as Supreme
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepalese Anny. The constitution
allowed the king to retain this right, and to appoint his Commander-in-
Chief .on the Prime .Minister's recommendation. A National Security
Councd led by the Pnme Minister will be in charge of all other military
operatIOns. These fOnTIulations, when seen in connection with the same
constitution's concession of emergency powers to the king (which should
be seen as a serious threat to the democratic elements of the constitution),
would prove (see discussion below) to be significant after the insurgency
started and the question of the Royal Nepalese Army's role in quelling
the Insurgency became a pressing issue.
. Other strongly articulated human rights claims were also only
partIally accommodated: even if discrimination on the basis of sex was to
be abolished, women were not in all respects accorded equal citizenship
rights. 49
Considering the dramatic political events in 1990, the first Jana
Angolan might most appropriately be understood as a rebellion rather
than a. re:olution. However violent and urban-supported it may have
been, It did not fundamentally change the political order. At this point
certain historical parallels between the 1951 and 1990 uprisings can b:
discerned. Both the "palace rebellion" in 1951 and the 1990 "urban
rebellion" lacked mass support in the predominantly rural population.
Both occurred at conjunctures of significant change in the international
order (the fall of the British Empire in South Asia; the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the subsequent democratisation). In 1951 as in 1990, both the
pro-democracy parties and the regime's loyal protagonists had
ideological and social ties with likeminded political parties in
neighbouring India, indicating a number of regional connections. In
addition, the official Indian stance was of great importance, especially so
in 1951. The Indian government and Indian political parties of secular
and staunchly Hindu fundamentalist persuasion were active players
during the 1990 events. New international actors (belonging to the donor
community), however, had also gained considerable political leverage in
Nepalese policies. In 1951, the democratic forces were out-manoeuvred
in the political negotiations and presented with a political fait accompli.
In 1990, the democratic forces gradually asserted a stronger agency
through mass demonstrations. But this agency was considerably
weakened by the ULF's internal ideological differences and by the tacit
consensus on the indispensable role of the Hindu monarchy, which
united the influential moderate Congress~led section of the ULF and the
old regime.
The drafting of a new constitution in the volatile transition period
nurtured great hopes that the constitution would indeed have agency as a
"model" for the real restructuring of the political order. Such hopes were
dashed. The "compromises" in the constitution would turn out to be
irreconcilable, and a testimony to the shared upper~caste and Hindu elite
orientation of the Congress and the old regime, and thus to the
unresolved power contradictions between the authoritarian state and a
rapidly diversiIYing civil society. The 1990 Constitution may thus more
appropriately be analysed as a model of these politically contradictory
and unresolved realities surrounding the negotiated "compromise".
A Halted Democratic Transition and Institutionalisation of Human
Rights
The establishment of a multi-party system, the growth of a vital civil
society, the ratification of a number of human rights conventions and the
establishment of a National Human Rights Commission, all give the
appearance of a democratic transition (between 1991-1995) with consi-
derate efforts to institutionalise human rights. This subsection seeks to
examine briefly how a contradictory development of political and civil
rights and an uneven economic development unable to address basic
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social and economic rights of the great majority or the rural citizen!)!
callle to have dcstabilising consequences.
Prior to the 1991 election. a pkthor::l of Ilew political parties sought
rcgistratinl1, sOllle of them lacking even an elementary political
program III e. The 1ll3jor political rartics also underwent fissions, t'usiolls
and supporter shifts. J\1any fmlllcr Panchayat leaders hecame members of
the Congress Part:'. a sign of the old political elite'", opp0l1unisll1. The
Congress Icadcr-ship \\clcotllcd Ihis intlu'\. as the:' hoped the jJCmcJlOs
would give' tlll'Jll an c\tcnded support hase in the rural areas where their
oLltrcach \\3,'; limited. The old patronage cultufe of c:\changing allegiance
for political of/ices flourisll\.:d. T\\o of the leftist parties ft'om the ULP
merged and estahlished Comlllunist Pariy of Nepal Marxist-Leninist
(CPi\'-Ul\lL) and emerged as th~ Congress's main political rival. 50
Among the other comlllunlst eontcnders was thc UniLcd People's Front
Nepal (the political wing of the Unity Celltre), \\hlch \\ould soon turn
from p<lrliamentary politics and start playing a major role as an extra-
constitutional force. In spite of the e\:odus to the Congress. t\\'o parties of
earlier jhlllchas (politicians tt'om thc Panchayat period) ---- with dubious
democratic credentials - stood fIX the election_ Both paJ1ies were
headed by earlier Prime \1inistcrs It'om the pre-(kmocratic period. 51
The 1991 eh:ction campaign in the rural areas was plagued by Illany
parties' inability' to pursue (j nation-\\ide campaign. Unlike the
controversial roY<llist ponchos and the united cOll1lllunist IXlI1y' (CPN-
UML). many l<lcked the basic party' inll'astructure in rural areas to engage
in the campaign. PolitiGtI repression by illegal and e.\:tra-politicalmeans
\vas also fairly common.
Parts oethe Rapti lone (Rolpa, Rukum, Dang. Pyuthan and Salyan)
of Illid-\vestern J\'epal had long before the People's Movement (dating
back to the 1950s) been an area of underground political agitation by the
then underground communist movement. In fact, onc of the national
leaders, the veteran Mohan Bikram Singh, came from this area. The
eastern part of Rolpa. formerly' pari of Pyuthan district, was already' ruled
by communists in 1957 (see de Sales, 2000), One of the Maoist splinter
parties, CPN (Masa!) called for a boycott of the 1991 elections. 52 This
call received widespread support, Pyuthan had the lowest voter turnout of
all districts (sce Thapa and Sijapati, 2003 :66). The Samyutka Jana
Morcha (SJM) was the political wing of the CPN Unity Centre 5 ; The
CPN Unitv Centre had not joined the United Lcn Front (ULF) alliance,
but opera~ed independently during the Jana Andolan. ]\·1any of the
political cadres within the CPN (Unity' Centre) bad found the ]<)<)0
compromise near to unacceptable. Nevertheless. they' decided to utilise
the multi-party system to engage in open public advocacy in order to
gain immediate parliamentary access, while retaining their longer term
objective of a revolutionary overthrow of what they saw as a regressive
regime. In the first Cieneral Election in May 1991 the Congress \\'l1n
seven of the I] parliamentary seats held by the Rapti Zone
constituentcies. SJrvt \\'on three (two in Rolpa and one in Rukutll) and lhe
CPN-UML one. The support for the S.lM is notable and relevant to our
understanding as to why' the Maoist insurgency later started in Rolpa and
Rukum. Amonu. the nominated Congress candidates, there wen~ a
sizeable numbe; of leaders from the Panchayat era. Reacting against the
placing of panc!w.\" high up on Congress lists, many voters chose to
support SJM,
The ensuine violent means of political competition bet\veen
Congress and SJM cadres can only partly' be explained by both parties'
long history as underground movements, used to violent political
methods. In addition to intact non-democratic institutional practices and
party cultures untainted by even proto-democratic "rules of the game",
t\\'o other factors \vere also of importance. One \vas the grossly' unequal
access of the Congress and the CPN-L'ML to the civil and military
branches of the state apparatus. Another important factor to reckon \-vith
was the new availability of a public space in \vhieh political vendettas
could be undertaken.5~ The general election was conducted relatively'
peacefully and reasonably fairly, indicating that elections were not a
no\/clty in Nepal as such. About 65 percent of the electorate voted, a
rather high rate compared with countries of similar levels of literacy,
poverty and communication systems. But there was evidence of use of
intimidation, vote rigging and votc purchase, suggesting that thc turnout
of genuine voters was somewhat lower than the official voter count. Two
parties stood out as the winners, The Congress gained 54 percent of the
seats (110 of205 seats) and CPN-UML won 34 percent of the scats. The
far leftist party SJM also did well in a number of constituencies and won
nine scats. The two parties of the former panchos did very poorly and
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gained only four seats (HMG(N), 1991: 179-181). The communist
parties' entry into parliamentary politics was unprecedented.
Retrospective studies of the voting behaviour at a national level in
the 1991 election show the core support areas and voter groups of the
communists and the Congress in those critical years before the
insurgency \vas launched. The communist parties did well in the
Kathmandu valley and in central and eastern Nepal. Moreover, they did
relatively well in the mountains and hills of the western and midwestem
regions (such as the Rapti Zone). The Congress did quite well in the
plains areas of the western, midwestem and far western regions.
Congress's electorate drew heavy support from elderly voters in the
traditional castes. The communists. on the other hand, had a younger
electorate, coming from rural small-holder, urban working class and
aspiring middle class backgrounds (See Borrc. et. aI., 1991:356-362;
Kumar, 200 I). The royalist party (RPP) drew mostly support rrom voters
with an ethnic background.
From mid-1991, Nepal had a democratically elected, Congress-
headed government and a promulgated constitution endorsed by most but
not all the leftist political parties. In the following months, G. P.
Koirala's government did not deliver on many of its promised initiatives.
Also, the economic indicators were unimpressive, inter-party rivalry for
spoils was on the increase and Indo-Nepali relations re-fuelled the
political system and public." The parliamentary opposition again
resorted to the streets, demanding Koirala's resignation. Even so, the
Congress government stay'ed in power for another short period through
the 1993 flood disaster and finally resigned in 1994 as a result of serious
intra-party dissent. The parliament was dissolved. The mid-term election
resulted in a hung parliament and the formation of a minority
government headed by the party president of the CPN (UML), which had
won the largest number of seats. SJM (Unity Centre-United People's
Front Nepal), which had recently split, did not win any seats. The UML-
led government was only in office for nine months, and was followed by
a coalition government under Congress leadership, supported by the unti I
then discredited party of the former panchas (Rastriya Prajatantra Party)








This split in 1994 was indicative of the serious ideological
disagreements within the SJM during the years 1990-1994. The party
had found the 1990 compromise more or less unacceptable. Already in
March 1992, SJM had presented the moderate-majority government with
a list of demands. 56 During the following weeks, they launched protest
programmes which were met with police violence and the killings of
demonstrators. Such excessive use of force could not but radicalise SJM
supporters.
During the whole 1990-1994 period, the party engaged in intense
ideological debates. These debates centred on the general applicability of
Maoism as compared to Marxism and Leninism, in addition to the role of
political struggle in relation to armed struggle and, in the case of armed
struggle, the relative merits of rural and urban insurgencies. The ensuring
dissent, also fuelled by personal rivalries, resulted in the purging of the
minority rraction of the Central Committee. The minority rraction stood
for the mid-term election as noted above. Also, the majority rraction
wanted to partake in the election due to tactical reasons, but was not
approved as a party by the Electoral Commission. Facing non-approval,
they called for a boycott of the mid-term election, probably as a tace-
saving measure. This fraction went underground right away and started
its preparations (both on Indian and Nepalese soil) for a new stage of
struggle. These plans were forged in close dialogue with its sister parties
under the auspices of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement
(RIM). Following the promulga-tion of the 1990 Constitution civil
society in Nepal expanded very quickly and also diversified as a result of
an enonnous growth in the number of development-supportive and
human rights-based international non-governmental organisations
(lNGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Nepal. This
growth was non-evolutionary, and artificially rapid due to mainly two
factors - both structurally related to the neo-Iiberal development
paradigm: (I) a massive influx of development assistance increasingly
geared toward supporting the NGO sector and, (2) massive establishment
of national, regional and local NGOs by both former civil servants (who
had lost their jobs due to structural adjustment measures) and by
bureaucrats and politicians, who saw the creation of own NGO as both a
viable strategy for economic diversification and for gaining a political
voice in civil society. The massive growth coincided with the
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globalisatioll of ne\\' social movements increasingly addressing gender,
religioLls and ethnic differences. C.ircater exposure to advocacy about
gender justice and to formal employment gave increasing numbers of
rural and urban Nepalese women a political consciousness of grievances
and the importance of collective action. The globalisatioll of the new
indigenoLls movement gave political legitimacy and direction to the nevv
fluorescing of ethnicall)! based-associations in Nepal. Considering the
rate of growth and proliferation of civil society acInI'S engaged in ··the
politics of difference", they could be seen as indicators of a considerable
improvement in certain aspects o[ political and civil rights (the right to
take part in the conduct of public an~1irs, the heedolll of association and
of expression, freedom of thought) in Nepal during those tumultuous
;'ears. But these indicators can only he meaningfully interpreted when
they are put in a context of a much more thorough look at the
accountability of the INGOs and NGOs. As the works by Bhattachan,
Dahal and Bkie amongst others have shc)\\11, there \\ere pressing
questions both the N(iO sector's dependency (and top down
accountability) on northern donors: its urban, regional, caste and gender
biases: \\'eak accountability to community-based institutions (and the
ultimate beneficiaries) and dependency on both the Nepalese state and on
markets (see flhattachan ct. aI., 2001~ fllcic et. aI., nd.; Dahal, 2001), As
is evident from both the above exposition and the subsection \,,'hich
follows, other aspects of political and civil rights (the freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention, equality' before the courts, equal protection
of the law, fi'cedol11 from arbitrary and unla\vful interference into privacy
and home) \vere increasingly violated under the nascent multi-party
democracy. This becomes particularly evident if \vc examine the
deterioration of civil and political rights in the Rapti 70ne of mid-
western Nepal, where the Maoist rebellion \vas initiated in 1996.
Preparations for People's \Var
Reports from human rights observers indicate that in Rolpa District
alone, perhaps as many as 1,000 people \vere arrested between 1992 and
1996 under the Public Otfences Act (See SAHRDEC, 1996), Allegedly,
hundreds of SJM activists were harassed and \vere also faCing false
charges by NC and RPP party memhers, The 1992 local elections form
the direct backdrop for these charges, The district administration,
including the political authorities as well as the police and judiciary, did
not handle these cases in a transparent and fair manner. In tact, evidence
suggests the local elite party cadres acted in collusion witb the police.
In 1994, SJM centrally decided to boycott the mid-tenn poll. CPN-
UML (which, based on the results, came to fonn a minority government)
captured some of the earlier SJM voters, Also, NC obtained a favourable
electoral result in the Rapti Zone. Reports of political and police violence
in Rapti led the newly elected CPN-UML government to commission a
report on the allegations, The report, which spoke of unlawful detention
on false grounds and forced incrimination by police and local political
leaders, was not widely published by the government, allegedly to not
overstrain relations with the Nepali Congress (See SAHRDEC, 1996),
Their local cadres were implicated in a number of the investigated
incidents, As the Nepali Congress again came to power in 1995, the
party's central and local leaders intensified their efforts in order to extend
their voter support even further by undermining and taking over SJM's
support base. Many SJM supporters chose to leave the party as it
otTicially went underground, The party expelled those members who
took part in the mid-tenn election, Many of those who did not partake
went to live in India, where the Maoists had well-established
collaboration with a number of militant leftist Maoist parties, Jointly,
they started ideological and military preparations for an uprising on
Nepal's soil. This uprising was seen as integral to a world revolution of
the proletariat
Observing closely both the developments at the central and local
levels, the underground central leadership of the CPN (Unity Centre), the
Prachanda Fraction, developed its final and consequential ideological
considerations for the next stage of strugg le, Party documents, interviews
and the published writing of the Prachanda Fraction's chief ideologue
Baburam Bhattarai provide us with few clues for judging whether the
leadership devoted time to a last, specific political assessment of whether
they should consider to make a final effort to create a broader popular
movement in pursuit of a non-violent solution to the mounting cultural,
pOlitical and economic contractions of the Nepalese society (see
I3hattarai, 2003a and 2003b),
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As the fornlal decision for a protracted war was to be taken, in 1995
the Maoists' and their supporters experienced human rights violations by
a new regime claiming to be democratic and accountable to its
international human rights commitments. Precisely hO\'\I- these
experiences affected the leadership's decision to opt for warfare is
ditlicult to ascertain, but the experiences undoubtedly had a mobilising
effect when they started to prepare ideologically and organizationally for
the uprising in Rolpa and Rukum (two neighbouring districts). A
f()fcrunner of the uprising was the Sisne-Jaljala (the names of two
mountain tops) campaign. This political campaign was started by the
SJM in Rolpa and Rukum hom May 1995.57
In September 1995, a Congress-led coalition government succeeded
the minority government led by CPN-UML. With a hawkish, law and
order-oriented government, local politics in Rolpa and Rukum turned
even more violent in the autumn of 1995 than in the previous years.
Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), national human rights NGO,
reported human rights violations in 1994 and 1995 by police forces in
those areas of Rukum and Rolpa that were strongholds of the United
People's Front (SJM). The same reports also contain accounts of SJM
supporters' attacks on Congress workers (INSEC, 2002; 2003).
One major incident that led to further escalation of violence took
place in Rolpa in October 1995 in connection with the launch of a
cultural programme. A clash broke out between NC, RPP and SJM
activists, leaving a sizeable number of supporters injured and arrested.58
The NC-RPP coalition government's response in November-
December was a large-scale police operation called "Operation
Romeo".59 There are a number of reports documenting excessive use of
violence and a large number of arrests (of both SJM members and of
ordinary non-activists) on false or arbitrary grounds (See SAHRDEC,
1996). Most were arrested under the Public Otfences Act. Reliable
reports suggest that police made extensive use of the rape of women and
girls as a collective punishment, in order to shame and humiliate."
According to reports, party workers hom the ruling party directed police
searches of homes of UPF cadres in 11 villages in Rolpa (See
SAHRDEC, 1996:12). Such acts discredited the forces of law and order,
alienating local activists and ordinary villagers and fostering resistance
among already radicalised political elements.
By late 1995, the fateful decision to engage in armed struggle was
taken. The brutality of "Operation Romeo" thus suited the preparations
of the central Maoist leadership of SJM for protracted warfare, to be
launched in February 1996. On 4 February, the 40-point charter of
demands was presented by the SJM Chaimnan Baburam Bhattarai to
Prime Minister S. B. Deuba. The list contained demands for a new
constitution drafted by a constituent assembly, abolition of the monarchy,
abrogation of all unequal treaties with foreign governments, and several
specific demands related to political, civil rights and economic rights
(improvement of livelihoods) (see Thapa and Sinjapati, 2003: 189-194).
Before the deadline had expired, a number of government installations
were attacked on 13 February. The political nature of these attacks is
evident from the ways in which they were carried out. In the attacks on
two police stations in Rukum and Rolpa, political slogans were shouted
before and after the police were out-manoeuvred. No one was killed in
these incidents. The attackers looted explosive materials and other
valuables. The same day the plant of Pepsi Cola was attacked in
Kathmandu and a liquor factory in Gorkha was blasted. These early
attacks were ideological statements about the main targeted class
enemies: the multinationals, local/national capitalists and the extended
arm of the repressive government.61 The People's War, a military extra-
constitutional means of realising the political aim of first establishing a
"new democratic state" and eventually a communist state, was on. It
would soon spread to other western and mid-western districts and further
to the far west as well as some of the eastern regions.
Considering the 1991~ 1996 period as a whole, the early years of a
multi-party system would have been challenging for even a highly
competent government. With the old axis of palace together with the
amny and police being largely intact, added to an entrenched culture of
patronage in the upper echelons of government and within the
mainstream political parties, the most basic requirements for starting to
establish democratic governance based on answerability to human rights
concerns were neglected. With simmering political discontent and a
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dctemlined under-ground Maoist party with a regional support base, the
situation \vas ripe for confrontational politics by using violent means.
Violent Conflict Between 1996-2006
As stressed in the introduction, this article does not pretend to explain in
full the unprecedented escalation of the conflict between state forces and
Maoist guerrillas and militias during the decade. Instead, I will briefly
illuminate how the above analysis of constitutional wrangles as political
struggles over the attempt to define a principle of sovereignty and the
palace's ability to maintain and recreate extra-constitutional sources of
authority is relevant for understanding (I) why the two efforts at
negotiation apparently failed over the issue calJing a constituent
assemhly, (2) why the issue of whether the king or the Security Council
should control the anny is so sensitive, (3) the repercussions of the royal
massacre in June 2001 and how they interconnect with the current king's
use of emergency powers.
When the nation was still in an early stage of grieving over the
killings of the king. queen and their nearest relatives, the beleaguered
Premier G. P. Koirala stepped down, due to being under investigation for
the abuse of authority'" and a wrangle with the Royal Nepalese Army.
Koirala gave way to one of his party opponents, S. B. Deuba, who had
been arguing for some time that the Maoist insurgency was a conflict in
need of a political solution. Deuba immediately declared a ceasefire (the
announcement was reciprocated by the Maoists' military and political
leaders) and started to prepare in earnest for negotiations. His political
ambitions at that stage for solving the impeding crisis \vere related to his
recent high-level contacts with the rebels, and also to his family
connections to elite Ranas, who are influential within the Royal Nepalese
Anny.6J After the wrangle with the fonner Premier G. P. Koirala, the
Royal Nepalese Anny had an interest in showing a willingness to
collaborate with the elected government. In spite of these enabling
conditions, the negotiations failed in November 200 I after three rounds
of talks.
The main reason for the breakdown was the Maoists' demands for a
constituent assembly and a republican state.'" Nearly two years later, the
government's dismissal of the Maoists' demand for a constituent
assembly was again one major reason for the breakdown of talks after
seven months of ceasefire. King Gyanendra's dismissal of the Deuba
government and his assumption of executive powers in October 2002
formed the backdrop for the second ceasefire in late January 2003. The
new royalist government, which was deemed illegal hy the parliamentary
parties, also contained ministers this time with a conducive mix of
personal, caste/ethnic and royalist connections, mustering the social
capital necessary to act as dialogue partners.('S The protracted
negotiations again found themselves stranded66 in regard to the issue of a
constituent assembly and the amlY's serious violation of the ceasefire-
the so-called Doramba incident. In response to the Maoists' demand for a
constituent assembly, the govern-ment posed its version of constitutional
monarchy, based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people.
Remarkably, this government party was appointed by the king, who had
just violated this principle on grounds of extraordinary circumstances, as
spelled out in Article 115 of the 1990 Constitution. The Maoist
leadership, like so many of their communist predecessors, again failed to
gain acceptance of their demand.
But much more important in the longer run, the Maoists managed to
use the seven-month ceasefire to engage politically with the general
public and mainstream political parties in a manner which lifted the
demand for a constituent assembly to the national level. This widened
sympathy for their basic demand is a step forward. So is, most definitely,
an increased recogni-tion of its democratic rationale as a process leading
to a new constitution that can be "a model for" reconstituting state-
society relations in Nepal. Even with this new openness to the demand
for elections to a constituent assembly, however, there are justified
concerns and fears about the road towards its realisation and about what
kind of constitution would be the outcome. One such worry is how such
elections could be conducted fairly in a far-flung country where, in many
districts, government presence is confined to the district headquarters,
and in a number of areas the Maoists are now the sole governmental and
political actor. The party structures of all the parliamentary parties are
mostly disrupted.
In January 2004, a spokesperson for the Maoists stated that they
would be ready to accept a constitutional monarchy if the king were
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willing to relinquish his command of the army and accept that a sizeable
number of milit31)' officials should be removed from their positions,67
This stance, if fully backed by the political and military leadership, is a
significant signal of the Maoists' fundamental ideological and military
concern with dismantl-ing the kingship-army axis as one founding pillar
of the monarchical state. The demand for the axing of the top and middle
level leadership of the army is also part of this dismantling strategy. It
seeks to address the need to undermine the old axis between the top
echelons of the military and the extra-constitutional centre, the palace.
Thus. their recent move, if serious, could be understood as being related
both to communist ideology in regard to hO\v the conditions for
transforming a semi-feudal state into a transitory democratic (bourgeois)
state and later into a communist state can be established, and to the
Nepalese communist movement's memory of the past 50 years of
political struggle against an autocratic monarchical state. As the above
discussion reveals, the Maoists' political predecessors have over and
over again experienced the monarchy's firm backing from the army and
police in remaining the centre of authority, whether this meant suspend-
ing constitutions or disregarding constitutional proto-democratic reforms.
As shown above, circumstantial convergences of international and
national events both in 1950 and 1990 influenced the course of political
events in Nepal. The II September attacks, which occurred during the
second and third rounds of peace negotiations, came to alter Nepal's role
with respect to the international security agenda. The world's only super-
power and its allies placed the conflict in Nepal on their own mental and
geographical map of Asian "terrorist hot spots", and therefore offered
substantial military aid. The Nepalese government was not able to
withstand the US and UK's mix of courtship and pressure, and opted for
a military solution to the conflict. This was conveniently used by the new
king, who declared a state of emergency on 26 November 200 I, using
the aforemen-tioned Article 115 on emergency powers in the 1990
Constitution. The constitutional rights enshrined in the constitution were
suspended, except the right to file habeas corpus. The Nepal Communist
Party (Maoist) and its supporters were declared terrorists." Thus, the 11
September attacks were used by the executive monarch to alter some of
the rules of the game and the relative strengths of the stakeholders
fighting for control over the state. The Royal Nepalese Army was, for the
I
j
third time in more than 150 years, mobilised against its own citizens.
With the increasingly wel1-equipped and numerous army troops entering
the battlefield, the number of deaths, casualties and human rights
violations increased dramatically. Perhaps less immediately noticeable,
but still very significantly, this deployment fundamentally altered the
way the king (as Supreme Commander) was constructed as a sovereign.
Since Nepal's imperial expansion was stopped by the Sagauli Treaty
with the British in 1816, the king-army axis has built on the notion of
protecting Nepal's stable national border. The employment of the Royal
Nepalese Anny against its own citizens undennines this border
definition, and establishes a much more contentious basis for the notion
of the sovereign warrior king. The deployment of the army was the
culmination of years of dispute between previous elected governments,
the army chiefs and the palace. The dispute reflects another defect in the
1990 Constitution. As a compromise, the king was conceded the position
of Supreme Commander, but had to act on the advice of a National
Defence Council (to be led by the Prime Minister). After 1990, the
political system had neglected to assert their role in the Council."
The murdered King Birendra's reluctance to mobilise the army
against the Maoists guerrillas during the early years of the emergency is
well-known, though this is not the full background for his tacit
understanding with the Maoist leadership. The differences between the
elected government and the palace over who was the commanding
authority actually was given emphasis in 1999, due to the preparation for
an internal security and development plan. This included the employment
of the army in all seriously insurgency affected districts. As already
discussed above, G. P. Koirala resigned partly over these wrangles. The
anny remained immobili-sed until after the Maoists overran a district
headquarters in September 2000. Then it was mobilised for security duty
in 16 districts and remained so until the declaration of emergency about a
year later. This new, militarily engaged, highly visible king-army axis,
oriented towards internal enemies, might in the short run consolidate the
axis, as the army is tethered with new positions and advanced weapons.
However, fighting in hilly terrain cannot be undertaken only by air
strikes alone. As the losses of army personnel increase, resentment and
hatred by the population caught between the combatants will also grow.
In the face of such prospects of increasing de-legitimisation of the army,
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one can foresee the possibility of strategic alliances between elements in
the anny and other parties searching for a non-military solution.
Another key agent implicated in determining the role of monarchy
in the short and longer term is the current King Gyanendra himself. The
circumstances of this king's accession to the otlice arc extremely
contentious. As long as the official version of the bizarre events to the
effect that the crown prince committed regicide because he was
forbidden to marry his long-time girlfriend arc not better substantiated,
the great majority of Nepalese------ with their acute historical memory of
conspiratorial palace politics-- will remain suspicious of the possible
role of the current king and other surviving relatives in the massacre of
his own brother, sister-in-law, their children and some other close
relatives. This tarnished image of the Nepalese monarchy internationally
is a mental burden on the intellectual middle class and elite, who are
paintully aware that even the slightest hints of such serious allegations
would result in full investigations in any state where basic judicial
accountability mechanisms are in force. There might be indications of
another parallel trend of a more distanced, reflexive attitude among the
rural population in insurgency atllicted areas towards the monarchy. If
these tendencies are reinforced in the coming years, the cultural
hegemony of divine kingship shall indeed be under challenge in Nepal.
The king's political performance so far indicates that he might be
ready to and capable of consolidating his power at the expense of any
new deal between the state and civil society. He is, in other words, a
worthy successor to the legacy of his authoritarian and unscrupulous
predecessors, whose central place in the political history of Nepal was
analysed in this article. The Kot Massacre in 1846 brought the Ranas to
rule Nepal for a century. Then internal strife within the Rana family
acted as a factor in the downfall of the Rana autocracy in 1950. Again
internal strife, whatever the actual circumstances were, struck in 2001
when the country was already facing a dramatic destabilisation, These
notable, but less visible and discussed repercussions of the royal
massacre on public support for the Hindu monarchy might very well
accentuate the drift towards a republic in Nepal.
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The years 2005- 2006: a Second People's Movement - ending in a
Comprehensh!c Peace Accord
The last few years have seen political change of a structural kind in
Nepal. The scenario has moved trom a seemingly entrenched triangular
conflict betv•.:een the autocratic and power-seeking royal regime, a fragile
seven party alliance and a still assertive Maoist movement, to a basically
bi-polar conflict that evolved into a second pcople's movcment, which
finally pressured a recalcitrant ruling monarch to reinstate the dissolved
parliament. The reinstated House of Representatives enacted a number of
historical decisions. The state \vas declared as secular and constitutional
control and control over the army was transferred from the kingship to
the parliament. The parliament also accelerated the stale peace talks \vith
the CPN (Maoist), by opening up for real negotiations over the most
disputed issues, including the future role of the monarchy, the
composition of the interim government, modalities and functions of the
Constituent Assembly and of the disanna-ment, demobilisation and
reintegration process.
Let me first describe in some details the trajectory of this rapid-
moving political transformation, which many would say, IS
unprecedented. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) support for the
agitation of the seven-party alliance (SPA) could not but in the longer
run weaken the King's bargaining position. The agreement between the
new partners was mainly limited to the issues of the royal takeover and
constituent assembly, as the CPN (Maoist) opposed the SPA's demand
for revival of the House of Representatives. The alliance's "roadmap" for
peace was no doubt inade-quate, due to its heavy reliance on the political
and constitutional events of the 1990-movement. The roadmap's
inadequacy also refiected the ongoing intra- and inter-party contlicts and
the increasing gap between senior leaders still supportive of the
constitutional monarchy, and second and third-generation leaders who
were increasingly supportive for at least a real debate about a republic.
One might say that the alliance's roadmap was hopelessly outdated, as it
promised a retum to a parliament and a leadership that in fact had
contributed to the conflict escalation in the first place.
The 12-point pact trom November 2005, between SPA and the CPN
(Maoist) to oppose the royal takeover, should nevertheless provide one
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important precondition for the popular movement that unfolded
unprecedented over 19 days (April 6-24). This amorphous movement'''
expanded its support-base day by day and came to include all sections of
the citizcnry; also district towns became the hubs of popular
demonstrations whose force and message of the importance of human
rights, peace and democracy had a self-reinforcing effect. The attention
to the excessive use of force against demonstrators in international and
domestic media, protests from the diplomatic community and
international human rights groups and Nepalese Diasporas, served to
strip the regime for whatever remained of its legitimacy and facilitated
the final outcome. The final days of the movement became a
demonstration of a diversity of popular expressions of women, youths,
children, elders who had never taken to the streets before and the sections
of the citizenry who \vere quite experienced street fighters. The mass-
character of this movement and its democratic and peace-promoting
aspirational values, make it reasonable to argue that the Second People's
Movement of April 2006 was different from the rebellions of 1950,1979
and 1990, whose character I have analysed earlier in this paper,
On April 24, the hard pressured and domestically and internationally
discredited King Gyanendra announced the restoration of the House of
Representatives that he had dissolved in May 2002. Shortly thereafter, on
May 18, the House of Representatives declared itself the sovereign body
in the country, and dissolved the Royal Privy Council, reduced the power
and the privileges of the Kingship (such as the right to decide heirs for
the throne) and the Nepalese state was declared as secular.
This early accelerated phase between April and June 2006 was
followed by a much more contracted and unpredictable phase of tough
negotiations over the most contested issues: the status of monarchy, the
interim constitution, composition of the government, the modalities of
the constituent assembly and arms management. The tireless efforts of a
number of principal negotiators, pressure from the continued people's
movement and the intentional community, eventually resulted in the 10-
point Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) that was signed after the
SPA-Maoist summit meeting by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala







The CPA's preamble is an expression of the agreement as a
compromise between a revolutionary movement, which indirectly state it
ends the early 1 I year long "people's war" and the mainstream political
parties,"1 The CPA contains objectives and directive principles for
restructuring of the Nepalese state, goals for reforms of state-bearing
institutions, decisions to form (interim) institutions and bodies like the
constituent assembly, As has been remarked earlier in this paper,
constituent assembly has been a longstanding demand, dating back to the
early phase of communist party politics in Nepal. The Peace Accord also
spells out the conditions for a pennanent ceasefire, demobilization,
disannament, reintegration and resettlement.
While these political developments have been characterised as
unprecedented, they arc explainable \vithin the framework of analysis of
this paper. The simmering and action-inducing collective consciousness
as citizens among the rural and urban populace, that triggered the
(largely peaceful) mass-character of Second People's Movement, was
based on a convergence between certain distinct political movements and
related consequential events ITom 2001 and onward. The Maoist
movement's decade-long ideological awareness raising about the nature
of the Nepalese state gradually affected large sections of the society, and
the civil society's (and some media houses) steady-fast espousal of
liberal democratic values of social justice and participation (backed by
the international community, though not always united) came to
reinforce one another - opening up a genuine public questioning of the
old hierarchical order centred on divine kingship. The circumstances
around the royal massacre and the questions of trust surrounding the
successor King and the Crown Prince, and the decision to deploy the
Royal Nepalese Army against the country's own citizens, served to
intensifY the de-legitimisation of the century-old state-bearing model of a
sovereign king, protecting his people against foreign invaders.
CONCLUSION
The Nepalese Hindu state was fanned by the combination of brute force
and more benign co-optive and assimilationist political and social
strategies. Consent was built on cultural models of divine kingship, ofthe
bond between rulers and subjects and of a caste-based social order. These
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models gained a hegemonic status through state and state-sponsored
rituals which displayed the king's power in the representative public
domain, through the bureaucratic cOllrt-centred culture, and a civil code
as wel1 as land tenure and taxation system that the [{ana rulers appro-
priated and consolidated, In order to balance Nepal's sovereignty with
continued domestic control of the state apparatus, the Ranas accepted a
certain level of semi-dependency under the British in exchange for their
non~intervcntioll and acceptance of an isolationist policy. During the rule
of the Shahs and Ranas, the Nepalese state developed a historical
trajectory which had certain unique features. This apart. the Nepalese
institution of kingship shared certain basic structural similarities with
Indian princely states, \vhose actual power had been drastically curbed by
the British, who remained tolerant of the pompous state rituals. The Rana
rulers' isolationist policy, in a state based on rule by command and an
honour code that made political dissent a religiously sanctioned sin,
limited even the elite's exposure to \Vestcrn poEtical ideas of democratic
governance and a body politic or elected rulers and citizens.
The earliest e\:posure to any such ideas occurred in the 1920s and
1930s. This c\:posurc grew stronger in the 1940s as a direct result of the
nationalist independence struggle, which eventually led to independence
and a completely new political regional scenario. The events prior to and
during the J951 revolt, kno\\.'n somewhat misleadingly as ending
autocratic Rana rule, \vel'e rather intimately orchestrated by the newly
independent democratic Indian government, whose security interests had
primacy over the more uncertain prospects for genuine democratisation
in Nepal. The course of development in Nepal during the following
decades was predicated by the Indian economy's increasing dominance
and successive Indian governments' somewhat weary tolerance of the
preservation of autocratic rule - including the regime's successful
containment of the seeds of democratisation sown by B. P. Koirala's
brief period in government. The geopolitical location of the mountain
kingdom between t\VO very large countries, communist China and
democratic India, set the terms for the pragmatic foreign policies of
Nepal's rulers, and provided them with sufficient political space to
consolidate their control over the state apparatus, together with a nation-
building project that became more contentious than during the earlier
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Aller the 1951 palace rebellion, the ruling monarch quite
successfully managed to accommodate the expectations of the post-war
international community, ne\vly independent India and the traditional
elite by embarking on a modest modernisation of the state. The rapidly
grO\ving influx of foreign technical assistance and financial support
facilitated and accelerated this process of restructuring, \vhich successive
ruling monarchs followed up. By continuing to offer the traditional elite
privileged access to leading positions in the expanding civil and military
state apparatus while also accommodating to some degree the emerging
elites and aspiring middle class (groups whose very existence \vas the
result of new in-country educational opportunities), the monarchs
managed to consolidate their power. The aid-dependent expansion
allowed the flowering of a patronage-based and Ilinduized bureaucratic
culture, which, in the short term, strengthened both centralisation and the
monarchy. The concentration of authority in the hands of officials at the
palace created a classical mismatch bet\veen authority and responsibility,
distorting elemental)! principles of accountability and favouring
personalised ad hoc decisions, informal communication channels and
disregard for basic principles of competence and impartibility.
Pinpointing how a ne\v, complex and potentially destabilising form of
economic semi-dependency developed after 1950, this article has
analysed Nepal's political and administrative development be1\veen 1950
and the latc 1990s. A new critical form of reliance on Western donors
developed, in addition, an increasing economic dependence on India and
a less solid reliance on China.
While the regime \vas fairly successful for the time being in
bargaining expanded economic and educational opportunities against
acceptance of a limited kind of participation in "advisory" political
assemblies during the Panchayat period, the highly discriminatory nature
(to\vards service castes, ethnic groups and women) of this process of
integration, which was not only not effectively redressed but accentuated
by the development programmes of the 1970s and 1980s, created a
simmering process of political conscientiousness with respect to relative
deprivation, injustice and state responsibility. The communist parties
which operated as much on Indian as on Ncpali soil in the 1980s in spite
of their internal ideological struggles consolidated their position as an
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alternative political voice to the Western liberal onc, which was espoused
by the patrons of aid.
The 1990 movement was in certain respects triggered by regional
and international political events. And the form of the movement in
certain respects shmvs national political agents' active use of models for
political action that \vere disseminated by the international media. The
exposition has illuminated how frail the alliance was, fraught by
memories not only of past decades' ideological differences, but of
personality clashes and opportunistic po\ver politics. The political agency
of the movement was not only stifled by this frail foundation for joint
action. The movement \vas also stifled by the partially co-opted position
of certain key political actors (most importantly the Congress's) within
the old regime. This co-optation was helped by! the Congress politicians'
adherence to the hegemonic notion of a Hindu monarchical state. The old
political elite \\'cre also fractured. Hardliner panchas stood against
panchos with democratic leanings. The negotiated compromise and
contradictory constitution \\'erc largely results of these structural
conditions' containing and crippling effects on the 1990 movement. The
uneven alliance between the old palace-centred regime and the moderate
and rightist parties more appropriately characterised as patronage-based
networks created an array of effects bound together in mutually
reinforcing ways that virtually blocked any institutionalisation of
accountability mechanisms. Since a number of the connections and their
cause-effect-cause chain-like nature are still inadequately researched, the
question of the relative responsibility of the main leftist forces ~ the
United Front, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and CPN-UML - and
of the non-partisan democratic middle-class for neglecting to join
political forces to obtain a basically political solution during the 1991-
1995 period remains a sensitive and unresolved issue in the face of
increasing death tolls and the destruction of Nepal's infrastructure.
The analysis has shown how the last 50 years of political contention
and partly failed efforts to restructure the monarchical state in Nepal
have to be in no small measure explained as the result of contradictory
multi-scaled regional (Nepalese-Indian) interdependences. These were
found at the levels of governments (security policies versus a boarder






systems (the orthodox roJ'alist parties versus the social democratic and
some communist parties), civil societies (also comprising underground
revolutionary communist parties), and lastly at the level of a shared
Gangetic Hindu culture- affording religious and political legitimacy to
the Hindu monarchy. The CPN (Maoist) international connections, also
expressed through proclaiming the "People's War" as the vanguard for a
world revolution, have recently created new global-regional and local
interdependencies.
Political institutions in Nepal after the introduction of multi-party
democracy were not restructured either to respond to or fully to contain
the new pluralist, centrifugal forces fuelled by structural adjustment and
a rapidly expanding civil society. Like a "pressure cooker without a
safety valve", an intolerable pressure built up that resulted in the
declaration of war by a Maoist party bent on dismantling the monarchical
state and perusing a phased strategy for attacking the key functions of
this state and stripping it of what remained of its legitimacy.
The Second People's Movement, and the reinstated House of
Representative's historical constitutional decisions, including to declare
Nepal as a secular state and to open up for a negotiated settlement, lead
after a period of tough negotiations to the Comprehensive Peace Accord,
signed in late 2006. With a restored multi-party democracy, a peace
accord whose implementation requires continued commitments from
several stakeholders, a government authority with weak accountability,
gender, caste and ethnic-based social exclusion, a war-tom economy and
a radicalised citizenry, the consolidation of peace in Nepal depends on a
difficult social transfonnation in the years to come.
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and the other (the Malik Commission) alleged violations during the Jana
Andolan (between 18 Fehruary and 13 April). None of the reports \verc
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political left. The other party was headed hy Lokendra Bahadur Chand. Both
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for ratification. The Supreme Court ruled in December 1992 that the treaty
should have been ratified by the parliamcnt.
56. The full list is published in Thapa and Sijapati. (2003).
57. Sce the referencc in SAHRDEC (1996). to an intervie\\ in 1996 with the
, erstwhile Deputy Superintendent (OSfP) uf Police in Rolpa. The DSIP Sa\\
thc Sisne-Jaljala Movcmel1l i..lS the real start of the People's \\iar.
58. Of the 24 people arrested. sevcn of them wcrc charged under the Puhlic
Offences Act of 1970 and 13 for attempted murder. SAl IROEC (1996).
59. According to Thapa and Sijapati (2003:71). the operation was headed by a
Congress Home Minister known to be a ruthless politician. He was already
sued in a criminal case. accused of being implicated in a fatal shooting
incident \vhieh killed UML activists during the 1994 mid-term election.
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61. See the ML Party's own article on these incidents in Yew Worker. No. 2
( 1996).
68. The basis was a Terrorist and Destructive Activities Control and Punishment
Ordinance, \vhich \vas tollo\','ed in 2002 by the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities Act (TADA).
69. Former Chief Justice 13ishwanath Upadhyaya, who drafted the constitution
in 1990 and also the Civil Code in 1964 under King Mahendras autocratic
regime, is unusually blunt about this omission in a recent interview in The
Kathmandu Post (available at: http://\vww.nepalnews.com/Kathmandupost,
12 January 2004). He says: "Even in the case of the army, the constitution
fo:med a Defence Council with the majority of parliamentarians to operate
thIS body. But the ~~Iitieal parties never asserted their role and let the king







G. P. Koirala was under formal investigation by the Commission for the
Investigation of Abuse of Authority (scc Thapa and Si.japati. 2003: 115).
K. P. Bhattarai's short-lived government in 1999 appointed Deuba as the
leader or a high-level committee to suggest solutions to the Maoist prohlem.
After promising initial contacts. the hitter intra-party' dissent over the
initiative resulted in Uhattarai's JaiL and his critic G. P. Koirala. who
advocated a law and order approach to the Maoists. again became Prime
Minister.
Evidence about how the Maoists used the ceasefire to reorganise politicallv
and rnilitarily suggests that they had little faith in the negotiation;.
Immediately after the hreakdmvn. the Maoists proclaimed the establishment
of their parallel National People's Government and a number of large-scale
o.tTensives were launched in various parts of the country. Sudhir Sharma.
"Ihe Ethnic Dimension of the Maoist Insurgency (draft), (Kathmandu, 2002).
Minister Naryan Singh Pun, strongly royalist Magar and succcssful
businessman. is a good exam plc of such a pro-regime actor.
Both parties showed no commitment to follow the agreed Code of Conduct
and preparations \\i'ere poor. Both parties' official statements were
in~~nsistcnt. Both sides werc influenced by hardliners who pushed for
mJ1l~ary so~utions. There was no proactive support from the parliamentary
partIes, \vhlch were not a formal party to the nt:gotiations and whose main
agenda was the reinstatement of the parliament.
See http://www.kantipur.onlinc.com/php/kolncvl...s.phs&nid. 22 January
2004.
70. For a valid vie\vpoint questioning the role of civil sodety in the second
people's movement see CD. Bhatta's article in The Rising Nepal on 27 July
2006: Role of Civil Society in Conflict Resolution. also available at
http://nepal cl emocracy.org!contl ict.
71. The CPA states in its preamble "Pledging for progressive restructuring of
the state by' resolving prevailing problems related to class. ethnicity. regio-
nal and gender differences." The prt:amblc continues by stating: "Reiterating
commitments to competitive multiparty democratic system, civil liberties.
fundamental rights, human rights, complete press freedom. rule of law and
other norms and values of the democratic system". A vailahle at
http://'''iww .nepalnews .eom/archive/2006/nov/nov08/F ul I. ,text_summ it_mee
ting.php
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BORDER TOWN IN THE TARAI:
SITES OF MIGRATION I
Sondra L. Hausner
This paper relates the dynamics of three border towns, focusing on
Nepal's southern Tarai as a belt of migration. This paper focuses on the
contemporary geopolitical reality of the Tarai as a place in which both
hill migrants congregate and through which migrants leave Nepal and
travel to the Indian plains, in search of work, safety, and opportunity.
The theoretical aspects of the paper touch on the questions of voluntary
versus forced migration, and also, analogously or not, voluntary versus
forced prostitution (De La Costa and Alexander 1993, Doezma 1998). It
is grounded in a critique of the rhetoric of trafficking as the sole measure
through which the development industry - both international and national
_ views the movement of women across the Nepal-India border (Fujikura
200 I, O'Neill 200 I), and opts rather to focus on the labor conditions of
voluntary sex workers in Tarai migrant towns. Prostitution in border
towns is a global reality - border crossings in the Tarai are no exception
_ and our reflections on this region of Nepal must include ways to ensure
the proper treatment of sex workers.
Each Tarai border crossing poses a particular set of geographic,
cultural, and political realities, with various histories ~ certain routes are
more plied than others at different moments in time, which reflect
variable labor and market economies in India (Rankin 2004) and, in more
recent history, the Gulf, where an estimated half a million Nepali migrant
wage laborers live and work (Seddon et. al 1998, Seddon 2005), almost
all men.' Women who migrate are by no means ail victims of trafficking
rings (Frederick 1998, Hausner 2005), but those who are trafficked are
nonetheless among those who migrate. As far as we know, trafficking
destinations are not usually large towns on the border. But active sending
